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I ENJOYED  Jeffrey Frankel's paper. He uses theory nicely to structure 
the problem, and then with the aid of some reasonable guesstimates  he 
bounds the issues  quantitatively.  I will make two  somewhat  technical 
remarks and three of a more general nature. 
The first technical  remark concerns  the  current account  deficit.  I 
believe  that it is  substantially  overstated.  The  United  States  has run 
large unrecorded  receipts  for  several  years  now,  $30 billion  in  1984 
alone.  It is usually  assumed  that what is going unrecorded  is capital 
inflows, since it is known that the U. S. collection of data on capital flows 
is imperfect.  However,  it is noteworthy  that there is also a substantial 
world current account  deficit: in recent  years  the summation of total 
current account positions  around the world is not zero but substantially 
negative,  amounting to $70 billion in 1984. The world deficit is largely 
due to unrecorded receipts for services,  many of which are purchased 
by governments (and hence are recorded as payments) but received  by 
private parties.  The data collection  techniques  for many services  are 
even worse than those for capital movements,  and are a serious weakness 
in our external accounts.  Even bilateral comparisons with Canada reveal 
that Canadians record  several  billion  dollars  a year  more  in service 
payments to the United States than the United States shows in receipts 
from Canada. The shortfall in recorded U.S.  receipts for services cannot 
of  course  be  known  with  certainty,  since  we  are  speculating  about 
unrecorded transactions,  but it may well total $10 billion. This would 
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not have made a very large dent in our $100 billion current account deficit 
in 1984, but it would have eliminated the recorded deficit in 1982 and 
substantially reduced that in 1983. Net  U.S.  borrowing from abroad is 
not as large as it appears to be from the current account. 
It is perhaps worth noting that in the future the current account may 
have substantial unrecorded payments on services.  The U.S.  technique 
for estimating payments on liabilities to foreigners is to impute an average 
rate of  return to  the  recorded  liabilities  to  foreigners.  If the  general 
assumption is right that most of the large unrecorded receipts are in fact 
capital inflows, then the United States will not be recording the service 
payments  on  these  unrecorded  inflows  either.  But  that is  a problem 
largely for the future, and at present I believe  that on balance there are 
large net unrecorded receipts for services. 
The second technical remark concerns  Frankel's use of real interest 
rate differentials to measure an investor's  incentive to move funds from 
one country to another, a practice he shares with many analysts these 
days.  But an investor  residing in one country and investing in another 
rarely cares what inflation riates are in the other country. What he really 
cares about is the nominal yield on his investment abroad, corrected for 
any change he expects,  over the relevant holding period, in the exchange 
rate between  the foreign currency and his home  currency.  This latter 
correction  is typically  unobservable,  and we  know  that it is not well 
forecast  by the forward discount  or premium. But it is even  less  well 
forecast  by inflation differentials.  Frankel recognizes  the problem and 
computes real interest rate differentials using three alternative deflators. 
But the rationale for any of them is weak,  and I believe  that nominal 
interest rate differentials between major currencies would be more useful 
than any of these  measures  of real interest rate differentials.  Even the 
nominal differentials  corrected  with the forward discount  (not a very 
good measure) would be better than the real differential for measuring 
the incentive  to hold funds abroad for a specified  period.  Still better 
would be to collect direct evidence  on exchange rate expectations. 
I have  three  general,  or policy-oriented,  remarks.  First,  I do  not 
believe  that the large capital inflows into the United  States  since  1980 
can be explained by the "political  safe haven"  theory.  It is true that in 
1981 France elected  a Socialist government and West Germany experi- 
enced somejitters  because of political developments  in Poland. It is also 
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period  1980-82,  with Mrs. Thatcher riding high,  Britain had its most 
probusiness  government  in many years.  It is also  difficult to see  why 
funds should have left Japan to seek a political safe haven in the United 
States during any part of the past four or five years.  The argument is 
doubtful even with respect to West Germany. There was a remarkably 
stable outflow of long-term German private capital from  1980 to  1983 
(1984 data are not yet available).  Long-term foreign capital flows into 
Germany dipped sharply in 1982, but the decline  was more than made 
up  for  by  a  net  increase  in  short-term  capital  inflows.  Errors  and 
omissions  in the German balance  of payments  were  actually  positive 
during 1981, the  year in which jitters  might be thought to have  been 
greatest, flanked by modestly negative figures in 1980 and 1982. In short, 
there is no clear evidence  for capital flight from Germany on political 
grounds.  Like  Frankel,  I am inclined  to give  much greater weight  to 
economic  considerations  in explaining the large capital flows  into the 
United States. 
In  doing  his  rough  calculation  on  global  portfolio  management, 
Frankel focuses,  for reasons unexplained, on stocks of government debt. 
I prefer to approach the problem in terms of allocation of new savings, 
gross or net of replacement investment.  The United States accounts for 
roughly one-quarter of gross world product,  leaving about $11 trillion 
produced  in the  rest  of  the  world  in  1984. A  net  world  saving  rate 
conservatively  estimated  at 10 percent would imply about $1.1 trillion 
per year available for new investment,  net of replacement.  Is it implau- 
sible that the rest of the world would want to put 10 percent of its net 
new savings into the United States, given the U.S.  share of gross world 
product and of world trade? 
True, foreign investment in the United States of this magnitude would 
be historically unprecedented.  But there is much greater international 
interdependence  than ever  before,  and we  may be  witnessing  a vast 
diversification of investment  out of new  world savings.  Japanese  and 
European insurance companies  are diversifying their portfolios.  Many 
developing countries desire to repay some debt during the next several 
years and to rebuild their reserves.  It is at least possible that the rest of 
the world would be willing to lend to the United States at the rate of $ 100 
billion for several years.  (If the current account  deficit somehow  grew 
to $200 billion, as forecast by many, the willingness of foreigners to lend 
to the United States on that scale-20  percent of their net saving-for 248  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
the foreseeable  future would strain my credulity,  but is not inconceiv- 
able.) 
The  1984 investment  rate in the United  States,  while high, was  not 
exceptionally  high for a boom year. Therefore one cannot argue that the 
foreign borrowing that the United States has done is greatly augmenting 
the U.S.  capital stock compared with our past experience.  That means 
that Americans will have to service  their growing international obliga- 
tions out of a capital stock whose growth path has not been altered, and 
future U.S.  incomes will be lower than they otherwise would be. As the 
debt service burden accumulates, there will have to be some depreciation 
of the dollar in order to service the debt. Of course, if gross world savings 
grow at 10  percent, and the share that foreigners wish to put in the United 
States does  not change,  this growing burden of debt servicing will not 
reduce consumption  or weaken  the dollar so long as U.S.  debt service 
payments do not exceed  the (net) growth in new borrowing. 
It is worth noting that there is no close relationship these days between 
net borrowing from the rest of the world by the United States-the  U.S. 
current account deficit-and  the pressure that foreign investors  put on 
the dollar exchange rate. There are many financial obligations issued by 
non-American  entities  around the world now  denominated  in dollars, 
and foreign  investment  in dollar securities  issued  outside  the  United 
States also puts upward pressure on the dollar exchange rate. 
At exchange  rates prevailing in early 1985, the U.S.  current account 
deficit is likely to grow from the $100 billion of  1984, unless  economic 
growth rates accelerate in Europe and Japan. Absent that, maintenance 
of a U.S.  external deficit in the vicinity of $100 billion is likely to require 
a sharp drop in dollar exchange  rates from their early  1985 levels,  but 
that could happen and still leave them well above levels of 1980. 
What policies are open to the U. S. government to relieve the pressures 
inherent in the current situation? The obvious  one  is to take steps  to 
reduce the budget deficit, gradually but definitively,  thus reducing the 
draw of that deficit on private U.S . savings and the pull on savings from 
the rest of the world. Beyond  this, the Federal Reserve  could carry out 
open  market operations  in foreign  currency.  Frankel  calculates  that 
exchange  market intervention  could  have  a consequential  impact on 
exchange  rates, concluding that economists  have dismissed  too readily 
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advocating such intervention on grounds that it might or would revive 
inflationary expectations. 
I have  a different view.  I believe  that with  a carefully  articulated 
program the Federal Reserve could influence the exchange rate without 
reviving inflationary expectations.  It would explain that the dollar is too 
strong; that the  strong  dollar is  hurting American  industry,  perhaps 
irreparably; that  its  strength  is  intensifying  protectionist  pressures, 
possibly leading irresistibly to protectionist actions by Congress; and so 
on. The Fed would therefore take steps to encourage a drop in the value 
of the dollar, recognizing  that such a drop would  affect  the prices  of 
tradable goods,  especially  primary commodities.  It would assert that it 
is not thereby monetizing the government budget deficit. Indeed, it could 
actually reduce its normal intake of Treasury securities to underline this 
point. Its actions would thus be a combination of sterilized and unster- 
ilized  exchange  market intervention:  the first would  alter the  mix  of 
foreign and U.S.  bonds available to the public,  and the second  would 
result  in  some  increase  in high-powered  money.  Both  effects  would 
weaken  the  dollar; if skillfully  executed,  I believe  they  would  do  so 
without reviving inflationary expectations. 
This change in policy would have the additional advantage of pricking 
the dollar appreciation bubble, if, as I believe,  there is some element of 
a bubble in early 1985 (but not, as on Frankel's calculations,  going back 
to 1981). Data Resources,  Inc.,  has fitted an equation based on relative 
inflation rates, interest rate differentials, and current account imbalances 
that explains the real value of the dollar very well through 1983, but does 
very badly in 1984. In some sense virtually everyone  involved  believes 
that the  dollar  is  unsustainably  strong.  Yet  market participants  are 
betting, despite this widespread belief, that they can get out ahead of the 
crowd.  Pricking the bubble would result in a sharp drop in the dollar, 
but that would be  salutary starting from the levels  of early  1985, and 
gradualism could then proceed from there. 
There is of course one serious difficulty with this proposal: the Federal 
Reserve  is  not  in  charge  of  foreign  exchange  rate policy.  The  new 
Treasury team should take a hard look at it. 250  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
RUDIGER  DORNBUSCH 
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Peter  Isard and Lois  Stekler  do  an excellent  job  of  showing  that 
recorded  capital  account  transactions  cannot  give  an  unambiguous 
explanation  of the role of capital flows  in pushing up the dollar. The 
statistics cannot tell us who the actors are, or what their vehicles,  much 
less their motives,  might be. 
Isard and Stekler make two very specific points. The first is that there 
is no question that the United States runs a current account deficit and, 
to tnat extent,  is drawing down  net foreign  assets.  But whether  that 
reduction in net foreign assets  occurs in the banking sector or outside, 
whether in U.S.  banks or foreign banks, whether for reasons of interest 
differentials, enhanced profitability of capital, or safe haven, cannot be 
inferred with any accuracy from the data. Isard and Stekler rightly point 
out that there are only two reasons for trade in financial assets: liquidity 
trading and differences  in belief.  Only liquidity trading can plausibly 
account  for  net  capital  inflows,  since  it is  hard to  believe  that U.S. 
residents and foreigners systematically  disagree in their assessments  of 
risk and return. 
The second point Isard and Stekler make very strongly is that capital 
flows are not in any obvious  way related to the value of the dollar. It is 
easy to identify shifts in the capital account that never come close to the 
foreign exchange  market. Here is an example.  The credit rationing of 
less  developed  countries  (LDCs) in the period  1983-84 has meant that 
these  countries  had to earn an increased  part of their debt service  by 
means of trade surpluses, rather than continuing, as they had previously, 
to borrow to pay the interest. In terms of U.S.  balance of payments,  we 
see a worsening of our trade balance and a capital inflow corresponding 
to the reduced rate of bank lending to debtor LDCs. The reduced rate of 
bank lending abroad might be said to enhance the dollar, but that effect 
is precisely offset by increased trade deficits owing to the need of LDCs 
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their effect on the exchange  rate but explain a major part of the shift in 
the capital account. 
The lack of a close  link between  the baiance  of payments  and the 
dollar is particularly clear in the case of safe haven arguments. Do safe 
haven  investors  shift  from  one  jurisdiction  to  another  or from  one 
currency denomination to another? Shifting dollar deposits from Zurich 
to New  York surely does nothing to the dollar even though it will show 
as a capital inflow. But are there any effects  if a sheik withdraws CDs 
from the Eurodollar market to place them in the New York stock market, 
while as a result a Frankfurt bank whose  funding is reduced  sells  off 
some of its holdings of U.S.  T-bills? Without a model of the exchange 
rate, we  cannot even  start answering that question.  Indeed,  when  we 
say an increased  demand for "dollars"  strengthens  the dollar, do we 
mean MI,  dollar denominated bonds,  U.S.  government  dollar denomi- 
nated bonds,  securities issued by U.S.  residents,  or any asset located in 
the United States? 
Nobody  really means  literally that portfolio  shifts are centered  on 
shifts from one country's MI to another. Even ardent "currency substi- 
tution" advocates  have now relinquished that belief. But that means we 
have  to  look  for  exchange  rate  determination  throughout  the  asset 
market,  not  only  in  the  money  market.  The  monetary  approach  to 
exchange rates seemed  to promise a close  link between  exchange  rates 
and monetary variables. It was built around the idea of a tight purchasing 
power parity (PPP) relation and a stable demand for money, a combina- 
tion that assured that money suppliers were the only significant influences 
on exchange rates. Not much is left of that approach now that both PPP 
and the stable real money demand have vanished. Nor is there an equally 
simple framework to replace the monetary approach. 
The fashionable theory today is the Mundell-Fleming model, with its 
emphasis  on sluggish wage-price  behavior,  combined  with a portfolio 
balance model that emphasizes  risk premiums as determined by relative 
asset  supplies.  But even  that much richer model  is not enough.  Two 
points in particular deserve  attention.  First, as Jeffrey Frankel's  sym- 
posium  paper  makes  very  clear,  the  risk  premium  is  quantitatively 
negligible, at least  in the context  of a mean-variance  framework.  The 
problem is the following:  suppose  real money demand in each country 
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independent of both wealth and foreign asset returns. Then interest rates 
are set  by  real money  supplies  and real income  levels  in LM  curve 
fashion. Given the interest differential (nominal and real), relative bond 
supplies determine the rate of depreciation and the level of the exchange 
rate. The model predicts, given Frankel's finding, that an ever so slight 
change in anticipated depreciation  will balance  portfolios  even  in the 
face of very large changes in relative supplies.  A move of a percent or 
two on the level  of the exchange  rate and a move of a few basis points 
on the rate of change of the exchange rate combine to clear asset markets 
even  in the face of a $100 billion shift in supplies.  One is puzzled  then 
about  how  to  explain  the  large  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates.  The 
exchange  market joins  other asset  markets where excess  volatility has 
already been identified as a difficult issue. 
Second,  a specific  shortcoming of the exchange  rate models now in 
vogue  is the omission  of real assets  from portfolio  considerations.  A 
good day on the stock market is worth more in terms of relative asset 
supplies than a few weeks  of federal budget deficits.  Seen in this way, 
exchange  rates are determined jointly  with long-term bond prices and 
stock prices, and there is simply no sense in trying to separate exchange 
rate determination from the setting of all other asset prices. 
In discussing  the cost  to the United  States  of the high dollar, Isard 
and Stekler point to the increased  cost  of external debt accumulation 
involved  in present and prospective  current account  deficits.  It is true 
that highly persistent,  large deficits do raise the long-run cost  of debt 
service  significantly and hence reduce long-run real income.  But is that 
an alarming prospect  for the  United  States?  It can readily be  shown 
(using the intertemporal budget constraint) that a present deficit in the 
external balance  of  1 percent  of GNP,  being reduced over time by 20 
percent per year, involves  a long-run cost in terms of debt service equal 
to  1.3 basis points,  or a percent of a percent  of GNP.  The calculation 
makes the point that, to be significant at all, deficits must be large and 
persistent.  The danger occurs when a debtor country experiences  a rise 
in real interest rates and a collapse in growth rates of output. A transitory 
deficit is not a serious problem from the point of view of sustainability 
or long-run real income. 
A much more serious issue is the crowding out of existing capital and 
jobs  by exchange  rate overvaluation  as firms in trade-exposed  sectors 
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employment has declined by nearly 7 percent, and continued strength of 
the dollar will only  accentuate  the difficulty that some  industries  are 
experiencing  as  a result  of  the  overvaluation.  It  is  one  issue  if our 
borrowing today has no counterpart in capital formation to help pay the 
interest rate. It is quite another if it actually leads,  via bankruptcy or 
relocation, to a reduction in domestic potential output. 
The discussion  of long-run prospects  for the U.S.  external balance 
invariably focuses  on a real depreciation of the dollar as a way to wipe 
out the trade deficits. But that seems to exaggerate the ability of the rest 
of the world to bear deficits. Do LDCs get to borrow again to run deficits, 
and, if so, from whom? Or does Europe find that it can easily live with a 
lower dollar even in the face of the dramatic real wage and employment 
problems that Europeans bemoan even now in their position of under- 
valuation? The adjustment of the U.S.  current account deficits can come 
as much from a change in relative activity levels in the United States and 
abroad as from a real depreciation of the dollar. 
The  sensible  strategy  at  this  stage,  of  course,  would  be  a  fiscal 
tightening in the United States, accompanied by an easing of real interest 
rates. Those countries in Europe that have already gone beyond fiscal 
consolidation (West Germany and the United Kingdom especially) would 
lead a European expansion by means of tax reductions and a real interest 
rate reduction matching that in the United States. The worldwide decline 
in real interest rates and the continuation of growth would benefit LDC 
debtors and budget deficits worldwide.  Growth in the rest of the world 
would rise relative to U.S.  growth,  thus providing a correction  in the 
U.S.  trade deficit. 
Suppose these  sensible  adjustment policies  are not adopted and the 
dollar remains strong or grows even stronger. Would it be important to 
take some immediate policy  steps? An import surcharge, an idea that 
has been discussed  in this context,  would disrupt the world economy 
and harm U.S.  exports.  One alternative, a reconsideration  of interven- 
tion, is particularly appealing if one thinks that the high dollar represents 
a bubble. Intervention  to burst the bubble might follow  a strategy  of 
causing "disorderly  markets,"  trying to achieve  large declines  in the 
dollar per unit of  time  so  as  to  weed  out  all but the  most  obstinate 
bubblers. But if the high dollar reflects more basic portfolio preferences, 
a forceful alternative would be an interest equalization tax or simply a 
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particularly  relevant  if safe  haven  motives  account  for  the  capital  inflows. 
If the United  States is considered  so excessively safe that  it suffers  trade 
problems  as a result, then it makes sense to charge  rent  for this place in 
the sun. Certainly  such a policy would have a favorable  fiscal effect. It 
would also quite likely precipitate a fall in the dollar. An interest 
equalization  tax is not a complete  solution,  because the depreciation  and 
the resulting  trade improvement  would push up inflation  and interest 
rates, thus shifting  the disequilibrium  to other sectors of the economy. 
But it could help force the fiscal correction  that is ultimately  the only 
way to unravel  the knot. 
JAMES  TOBIN 
Yale University 
Almost  everyone agrees  that  the dollar  is too high  for the health  of the 
American  and world economies. Almost everyone is frightened  by the 
prospect  that  it will fall. Why? 
It is one thing to manage  a fall in the dollar  by a change in the U.S. 
policy mix, actual  or scheduled.  It is quite  another  thing  if the dollar  falls 
of its own weight  without  any U. S. policy correction.  The source  of such 
a fall would be a shift in world portfolio  preferences  away from dollar 
assets, for any of a number  of reasons:  downward  revision in estimates 
of the future equilibrium  value of the dollar;  portfolio saturation  with 
dollar assets at long last; changes in the international  distribution  of 
wealth  because  of the structure  of current  account  surpluses  and  deficits; 
reassessments of the risks of different  currencies;  expansions abroad 
that  absorb  domestically  the high  saving  capacities  of foreign  economies. 
The U.S. policy mix must  be corrected  eventually  whatever  happens 
to the dollar. Early action is clearly the better way to bring  down the 
exchange value of the dollar. Stephen Marris  does not expect that. He 
anticipates  an autonomous  flight  from the dollar, lowering  its value by 
as much as 40 percent by 1989. As a result, he expects an economic 
disaster,  a stagflationary  recession reminiscent  of the 1970s,  beyond the 
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an internationally  cooperative  strategy  with somewhat  better  prospects 
of success, but he seems to have little hope that it will be adopted in 
time. 
I do not know how to estimate the probability  of a flight from the 
dollar  as soon, as sudden, and as sharp  as Marris  expects. He is talking 
about the puncturing  of a bubble, intrinsically an event that defies 
rational  economic analysis. Unlike Jeffrey Sachs and Jeffrey Frankel, 
in their  papers  in this volume, Marris  sees no solid basis for the present 
value of the dollar and does not think that it already embodies some 
expectations  of depreciation. 
In any case, I think Marris  exaggerates  the short-run  consequences 
for the U.S. economy, given intelligent  policy by the Federal  Reserve. I 
suppose  that  the Fed is managing,  I might  even say fine-tuning,  the U.S. 
economy along  a target  path  of real GNP. Right  now the path  is a "soft 
landing"  approach  to the inflation-safe  unemployment  rate (the natural 
rate), to be followed by sustainable  growth  at constant  unemployment. 
I believe Fed policy could be thus interpreted  since October 1982.  The 
Fed has braked  the economy  when its real  quarter-to-quarter  growth  has 
seemed overly exuberant,  and has stimulated  it when the recovery has 
threatened  to stall. Macroeconomic  performance  appears  to take prec- 
edence over targets for intermediate  monetary  aggregates.  The Fed's 
most  recent  Monetary Report to the Congress  emphasized  the likelihood 
of velocity swings  that  the Fed would need to offset. 
Naturally  the Fed becomes more cautious the closer we get to the 
runway,  and wants the excess of real growth  over sustainable  potential 
growth  to diminish  as the natural  unemployment  rate  is approached.  The 
Fed does not know what that rate is these days, and probably  adds a 
safety  margin  to Robert  Gordon's  estimate  of 6 percent.  Neither  do they, 
or we, know precisely what the growth rate of potential  GNP is in the 
1980s.  We will all learn more as and if this recovery is completed. The 
evidence so far is that there is still some distance to go. At 74 percent 
unemployment,  which the economy has been experiencing  for almost a 
year  now, there  are  no bottlenecks  or shortages  of capacity  to be worried 
about,  and  prices and  wages are very well behaved. 
Given  this policy, an autonomous  shift  of portfolio  preferences  away 
from  dollar  assets would entail an eventual increase in interest  rates to 
stay on the desired real GNP track. At first, according  to the J-curve 
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there  would  be no additional  aggregate  demand,  and  consequently  there 
would be no need for higher real interest rates. Indeed, the situation 
might  be quite the reverse. Eventually,  though, net exports would turn 
around, stimulating  the U.S. domestic economy and necessitating an 
increase in interest  rates to shut off enough domestic demand  to make 
room  for the (algebraically)  higher  net exports. The J-curve  should  give 
the Fed enough  time to complete the recovery, even if the "run" from 
the dollar  were to occur this year. 
Completion  of the recovery is very important  in the present  context, 
because it will provide additional  domestic saving to replace the net 
foreign  saving  that  we are  assuming,  following  Marris,  will  be withdrawn. 
If the economy is about 14 unemployment  points above the natural  rate, 
that  is equivalent  to about $120  billion  of GNP. Of that, some $50  to $60 
billion would be additional national saving, including a $30 billion 
reduction  in the federal  deficit. This is about half of the present  current 
account  deficit. 
I emphasize that tightening of Fed policy should be designed to 
maintain  macroeconomic  balance  of demand  and  supply,  not to "defend 
the dollar." A recession would be a perverse response to the shock 
under  discussion.  It  would  diminish,  not increase,  the economy's saving. 
In particular, cyclical additions to  public debt would permanently 
increase its interest burden, a major  factor in the projected  growth of 
deficits  and  debt in the future. 
How large would the eventual rise in interest rates have to be? 
Assuming  a shift out of dollars sufficient  to wipe out the present $100 
billion trade deficit, Marris  estimates 350--500  basis points. I guess it 
would be only half that if completion  of recovery provided  another  $50 
billion  of domestic saving.  (Note, incidentally,  that  any increase  of U.S. 
interest rates will presumably  hold some funds in dollars; that is, a 
portfolio  shift large  enough to balance the U.S. current  account would 
exceed the present  deficit.) 
Worries  about  dollar  depreciation,  however it comes about,  focus on 
price effects. Their  magnitude  has been debated  at length  in this room. I 
conclude that the fraction  of a depreciation  that would show up in U.S. 
price indexes is quite low. But the amount  of depreciation  in Marris's 
hard landing scenario is quite large. Ten percent of 40 percent is 4 
percent, and that  addition  to domestic  price  increases  within  one or two 
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accustomed  to. There  would  be lots of somber  hand  wringing  in the press 
and  especially  in financial  circles. 
I want  to stress two points. The first  is that some day we have to give 
back the price declines that dollar  appreciation  has contributed  to our 
disinflation  performance  since 1980.  Even Sachs, who defends  the policy 
mix that brought the appreciation, admits that. We borrowed some 
disinflation  from the rest of the world, and we have to repay, whether 
our depreciation  will be managed  or unmanaged,  orderly  or disorderly, 
gradual  or abrupt. 
The second polnt is that the main  danger  of the give-back  is not the 
one-shot elevation of our price level but the possible secondary spiral 
effects on the inflation  rate through  wage catch-ups, markups,  further 
wage increases, and so on. On  the whole, now seems a good time to face 
this risk-in  a slack economy with weak unions and quiescent wage 
settlements, with employers hungry  for volume and still frightened  of 
foreign competition. Moreover, in these times many importers and 
foreign suppliers  will absorb in their own profit margins  much of the 
dollar's  depreciation. 
I very much agree with Marris  that the present mix of monetary  and 
fiscal  policy in the United States is not viable. I too have an apocalyptic 
story to tell, but I do not think  that apocalypse  is imminent.  The budget 
deficit  need not prevent  the completion  of the current  recovery  or place 
that objective beyond the reach of the Fed. But the runaway  growth  of 
public  debt must  be arrested.  We are on an explosive track. 
Let me remind  you of the basic dynamic  equation  of deficit  and  debt: 
d = x +  (r-g)d. 
Here d is the ratio of debt to GNP, and d is its change with time. The 
term  x is the primary  deficit, which excludes transactions  related  to the 
service of the debt, again  relative to GNP. The net interest cost of the 
existing  debt is r, and  g is the growth  rate  of GNP. The equation  applies 
either  to federal  debt or to the nation's  net debt to the rest of the world. 
In the case of the government,  x refers to the noninterest  part of the 
budget;  in the case of foreign  debt, x refers  to the trade  account. 
It is obvious  from  the equation  that if both  x and d are positive and if 
r exceeds g, then d must  be positivle  and  must  remain  so as long as those 
conditions  remain  true, maybe  longer.  This is the case today for federal 
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d about 0.40. Add to these facts the assumption, which I regard as 
realistic, that the stock of private wealth to GNP is not indefinitely 
expansible. There is  some finite limit to it,  so  that the bigger the 
government  debt is, the lower the capital stock will be for the same 
amount  of net external  debt. Then the growth of debt not only crowds 
out capital  but picks up speed from the crowding-out  process itself. As 
the capital-output  ratio declines and the interest rate rises, the total 
deficit  and  debt rise faster  and  faster. 
This unstable  track  is a lot scarier  than the economists' usual tale of 
crowding out. The usual scenario traces out the transition  from one 
steady state to another  consequent  to a permanent  change  in the rate of 
national saving. Simulations  of this kind do not show very dramatic 
effects on future  standards  of consumption  or other variables,  and that 
is why economists' warnings  about  crowding  out carry  little conviction. 
But these exercises assume the existence of stable tracks, so that the 
comparative  statics of steady-state  equilibrium  legitimately  apply. That 
is definitely  not the case in the situation  now facing  the United States. 
The apocalypse of the unstable  track is the complete elimination  of 
gross investment, all gross saving being required  to absorb  the budget 
deficit. Even then, the debt and deficit are still growing, beyond the 
wealth and saving capacities of the public. What gives? A  logical 
possibility is q, the valuation  of the capital stock. You could imagine  a 
stock market  decline that lowers the value of the stock faster than its 
physical amount  is depreciating.  It makes sense for q to be below par 
when no gross investment  activity is occurring. 
My apocalyptic  story assumes away an inflationary  escape via mon- 
etization of debt; the Fed is assumed to monetize only enough to 
maintain  the inflation  rate  at 4 to 5 percent,  a fraction  of GNP decreasing 
as interest rates rise. I also assume that consumer-savers have no 
expectations  of tax increases  or other  budgetary  corrections;  otherwise 
some will say, following Barro,  that government  debt is not net wealth 
and  does not crowd out. My purpose  is to argue  that something  must  be 
done to create  expectations  of that  kind.  In a policy-oriented  discussion, 
it makes no sense to say that nothing  need be done because something 
will be done. 
Some observers  seem to think  that net borrowing  from  the rest of the 
world can relieve us of the costs and ultimate  hazards  of crowding  out. 
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net interest  cost below our own sustainable  growth rate. Obviously, if 
the foreign borrowing rate is even temporarily  below the marginal 
productivity  of capital  investment  in the United States, we should  take 
advantage  of it. But then the capital stock would adjust  to equalize the 
two rates.  After  that,  we would  be paying  the full  rate  of return  on capital 
to foreigners. 
The question would be: what is the schedule of supply of foreign 
savings to this country?  It seems likely that, as the federal  debt grows 
relative  to the economy, we will be able to import  foreign  capital  at the 
same or increasing  amounts relative to GNP only at ever higher real 
interest  rates. If so, the same explosive dynamics  that above described 
the crowding  out of domestic capital stock applies to the crowding  out 
of our  external  wealth,  as it  becomes  increasingly  negative.  The  exchange 
rate  would have to appreciate  continuously  to induce a primary  current 
account  deficit  corresponding  to the needed borrowing. 
This is the setting  for Marris's  apocalypse, his "hard  landing." The 
confidence  of foreign  lenders, and  of Americans  too, runs  out. Capital  is 
withdrawn  and the exchange rate plummets.  Surely this would happen 
when net foreign  debt came to exceed the capital  stock. Marris  thinks  it 
will  lhappen  long  before  that.  Whenever  it occurs, we then  have  to service 
or repay a debt at adverse terms of trade. In terms of the future 
consumption  opportunities  of Americans, this burden  plays the same 
role  as the  cessation  of gross  investment  in  the  purely  domestic  crowding- 
out scenario. 
In conclusion, I want to make it clear that I am not predicting 
catastrophes.  My prediction  is that  something  will  be done  to avert  them. 
The point of describing  them is to make the case for doing something. 
That something,  in my opinion, is a big change in the fiscal-monetary 
mix, designed to get the federal government's net interest rate down 
below  the sustainable  growth  rate.  Sachsjustifies  the extreme  and  bizarre 
Reagan-Volcker  mix by the timely assist the appreciation  of the dollar 
gave to disinflation.  He r  ecognizes that  his  justification  assumes  that  the 
policy mix will be reversed  in the future.  The sooner, the better. 